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1 Introduction
Assessments of the 1990s dot-com boom have shifted between two extremes.
Before the stock markets crashed in 2000–2001, there was widespread enthu-
siasm about the “new economy,” often including the belief that fundamental
economic principles were no longer valid in the Internet age. After the col-
lapse, the enthusiasm rapidly gave way to a new conventional wisdom holding
that the “new economy” had been based on an unfortunate coincidence of
greed, hubris and naïveté, producing little that was of lasting substance. From
the investor’s perspective, the latter assessment is indeed straightforward,
given the large amounts of money lost, as well as the fact that many of the
dot-com firms have folded altogether.
This article explores the possibility that dot-com firms had substantial,
lasting effects that were not reflected in the investor’s portfolio. We take
our motivation for this study from two strands of literature. First, in the
literature on serial entrepreneurship, it has been suggested that analyzing
individual ventures in isolation may be insufficient to evaluate the importance
of entrepreneurship, as it neglects potentially beneficial effects of entrepre-
neurial experience on the performance of later ventures started by the same
entrepreneur (Westhead and Wright 1998; Sarasvathy and Menon 2004).
Second, recent empirical studies indicate that individual firms can trigger
cluster formation by providing a seedbed for subsequent spin-off entry, which
tends to be concentrated locally. Examples include Fairchild Semiconductors
in Silicon Valley (Moore and Davis 2004; Klepper 2008), SP Radio in the
Danish telecommunications cluster (Dahl et al. 2003), and B.F. Goodrich’s
role in the emergence of Akron, Ohio, as the center of the U.S. tire industry
(Buenstorf and Klepper 2008). Can we observe similar dynamics in regions
that were home to (temporarily) successful dot-com firms?
To answer this question, we focus on learning processes within firms.
Previous research on spin-offs has highlighted the role of incumbent firms
as (involuntary) training grounds for employees (Garvin 1983; Agarwal et al.
2004; Klepper and Sleeper 2005). However, little is known about what exactly
spin-off founders have learned in their previous employments and what kinds
of knowledge transfer underlie the often exceptional performance of spin-
offs. Also, the interrelations between the regional spin-off process and other
processes affecting cluster dynamics, such as regional network dynamics, the
provision of entrepreneurial role models (Fornahl 2003), and non-spin-off
entry (see, e.g., Bresnahan et al. 2001; Feldman 2001), have been largely
unexplored.
In this article, we begin to pursue these issues in an explorative case study.
We trace the regional legacy of one of Germany’s most prominent protagonists
of the dot-com boom, Intershop Communications, the Jena-based maker of
e-commerce software for providers of online shops. Intershop was a global
pioneer of e-commerce software development that grew rapidly during the
boom. It subsequently encountered severe difficulties, losing money through-
out almost all its corporate lifespan. As with other fallen dot-com stars, today’s
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conventional wisdom has it that Intershop was an unequivocal failure. The
firm has been singled out as the biggest annihilator of investor money by
the German association of private investors (Deutsche Schutzvereinigung für
Wertpapierbesitz 2006). According to their estimates, Intershop stock valued
Euro 10,000 at the end of 2000 had a value of Euro 27 at the end of 2005.
Intershop has survived to date, but was forced to downsize drastically its op-
erations. Only most recently, its financial situation and employment numbers
seem to have stabilized.
We suggest below that Intershop’s temporary success allowed the firm to
make a lasting contribution to its home region. Intershop’s growth opened
a new trajectory for local development based on software and web-based
services rather than the traditional local industries, most notably optics and
instrument-making. Its subsequent decline was accompanied by new entrepre-
neurial activities initiated both by Intershop’s founding team and by employees
leaving the firm. Through creating new employment opportunities and keeping
human capital in the region, the spin-offs helped to sustain the favorable
regional dynamics initiated by the parent firm. Based on extensive interviews,
our empirical analysis allows us to identify the main channels through which
Intershop enabled these subsequent activities. Our results provide new insights
into employee learning as a basis of spin-off activities, and also into the links
between the spin-off process and other aspects of regional industrial dynamics,
including labor pooling and regional cooperation. In addition to presenting
specific findings for the Intershop case, the study thus suggests new directions
for future quantitative work.
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. Section 2 provides
the theoretical background of the analysis by summarizing prior work on
spin-off formation as well as the role of spin-offs in the evolution of indus-
try agglomerations. Section 3 outlines the empirical approach of the study.
Section 4 presents our narrative on the growth and subsequent decline of
Intershop. Section 5 turns to the entrepreneurial activities by Intershop’s
founding team that accompanied the firm’s downsizing. Section 6 discusses
the spin-off activities of other Intershop employees. It also relates the manner
in which a local support structure for nascent software entrepreneurs devel-
oped with Intershop’s support. Section 7 studies additional regional effects of
Intershop’s development. Section 8 discusses the implications of the case study
for the emerging literature on spin-offs and spin-off-based clustering. Section 9
concludes.
2 Theoretical background
Spin-offs (i.e., startups organized by former employees of firms active in the
same industry) have recently been the object of intense scholarly attention. In
this section, we summarize prior findings on the spin-off process and the role
of spin-offs in regional cluster formation. The emergence of spin-offs is then
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related to the notion of Marshallian agglomeration economies associated with
the regional clustering of industries.
2.1 The emergence of spin-offs
Spin-offs are a distinctive subset of entrepreneurial startups. Empirical re-
search has identified a number of regularities in the spin-off process and
in spin-off characteristics. Studies of different industries (e.g., Klepper 2002;
Agarwal et al. 2004; Klepper and Sleeper 2005) found that, on average, spin-
offs outperformed other de novo entrants. This suggests that building on
knowledge they acquired while working for the parent firm, spin-off founders
bestow capabilities on their ventures in ways that other founders do not.
Recent work has also found spin-off success to be related to the duration that
spin-off founders were employed at the parent firm, and to the kind of jobs they
held (Dahl and Reichstein 2006). Time requirements of on-the-job learning,
as well as superior learning opportunities faced by individuals in higher-level
positions, can account for these results.
In addition to enabling the acquisition of knowledge, prior industry expe-
rience also affects whether a business opportunity is discovered and how it
is framed (Shane 2000). Klepper and Sleeper (2005) show for the U.S. laser
industry that spin-offs tended to enter into markets that were closely related to
those served by their parent firms. These authors also find that spin-offs drew
on specific knowledge their founders accumulated on their prior job rather
than on more general business experience. Buenstorf (2007a) finds similar
patterns in the German laser industry.
While on-the-job-learning enables employees to discover entrepreneurial
opportunities and exploit them through spin-off companies, the empirical
evidence suggests that actual spin-off formation is frequently related to events
in the parent firm, such as changes in leadership and mergers or acquisi-
tions (Brittain and Freeman 1986; Eriksson and Kuhn 2006). Such events
often induce strategy conflicts (Klepper and Thompson 2006) and/or lead to
disruptions in the individual employee’s working environment. In analogy
to a distinction often made in the entrepreneurship literature, spin-offs can
thus be subdivided into two categories. “Opportunity spin-offs” are driven by
newly identified entrepreneurial opportunities, whereas “necessity spin-offs”
are triggered by external events that render continued employment in the
existing firm less attractive, thus reducing the (perceived) opportunity costs
of entrepreneurial activities (Buenstorf 2007b).
Research linking the characteristics of parent firms and spin-offs further
corroborates the conjecture that knowledge is transferred in the spin-off
process. First, the performance of spin-offs is positively related to that of their
parents, i.e. success breeds success in the spin-off process (Klepper 2002).
Second, better-performing incumbent firms are generally more “fertile” as
breeding grounds of spin-offs. The latter result has been further refined by
Agarwal et al. (2004) who distinguish between the potential and the actual
number of spin-offs. They suggest that, while the number of potential spin-offs
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increases with the capabilities of a firm, the actual number of spin-offs is
greatest when a capable firm generates new business opportunities without
exploiting them itself.
2.2 Spin-off-based cluster formation
Recent empirical work on regional agglomerations shows that spin-offs play a
crucial role in the formation of industry clusters. This was found for industries
as diverse as the semiconductor industry (Moore and Davis 2004; Klepper
2008), the U.S. automobile industry (Klepper 2007), the U.S. tire industry
(Buenstorf and Klepper 2008) and the Italian plastics district of Correggio
(Patrucco 2005).1 Spin-offs predominantly enter at or close to the location
of their parent firm. In this way, new entrants develop endogenously within
the region, and their capabilities derive from those of the parent firms. As a
consequence, more and better entrants can be expected in regions with more
and better incumbents in the industry.
Due to the self-reinforcing “success breeds success” dynamics of the spin-
off process, historical singularities such as the chance location of one or several
successful early entrants in a region can give rise to long-run effects on regional
development. The nature and orientation of early entrants in a region thus
shapes the region’s further technological development path. Given the crucial
role of critical mass and hysteresis effects implied by dynamic models of cluster
formation (Brenner 2004), it is, moreover, conceivable that entrants can trigger
lasting regional developments even when they are only temporarily successful
themselves.
2.3 Spin-offs and regional external economies
The intra-regional transfer of organizational capabilities through the spin-off
process informs a theoretical account of cluster formation that does not depend
on the presence of external economies stemming from traditional Marshallian
agglomeration economies (Buenstorf and Klepper 2006). However, potential
interrelations between the spin-off process and other dynamic processes of
cluster evolution are largely unexplored. Such interrelations may be relevant
along two dimensions.
First, successful early entrants in a region may not only be fertile breeding
grounds of spin-offs. Their growth may also give rise to positive external effects
on regional development that are not restricted to spin-offs. Potential benefits
accruing from these externalities operate through a variety of channels. For
example, successful firms add to the supply of human capital by attracting
1A variant of the spin-off-based model of cluster formation was observed in Cambridge (U.K.),
where spin-offs from technical consultancies, often becoming involved in product design and the
commercialization of new technologies, have gained in importance relative to university spin-offs
(Lawson 2003).
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skilled employees to the region and enabling employees to accumulate knowl-
edge on their jobs, thus enhancing the regional knowledge base (Fornahl
2007). Prior work on industrial clustering has also highlighted the impact of
new and growing firms on regional cooperation, customer-supplier relations,
regional value chains, as well as the orientation of the regional universities
and public research organizations (Lundvall 1988; Audretsch and Feldman
1996; Gray et al. 1996). Yet further effects may operate in a more indirect,
cognitively mediated fashion. Successful entrepreneurial activities provide
positive role models in the region, thus affecting other agents’ attitudes toward
entrepreneurship, their ability to discover entrepreneurial opportunities, and
their willingness to start firms themselves. In this way, cognitive factors may
help to explain regional differences both in the extent and the nature of
entrepreneurial activities (Fornahl 2003; Sørensen and Sorenson 2003).
Second, the spin-off process itself may be strongly intertwined with the
emergence of Marshallian agglomeration economies. Based on a case study of
an Italian manufacturing district, Patrucco (2005) suggests that local spin-offs
drove the regional diffusion of knowledge and the emergence of a common
knowledge base. The highly specialized spin-offs created opportunities for high
rates of vertical disintegration through sub-contracting. The spin-off process
can likewise be expected to enhance the potential for labor pooling in a region,
as it increases the number of potential employers active in the same industry,
which makes the region more attractive for specialized workers. Personal
contacts between spin-off founders sharing a prior employment in the same
firm are, moreover, a potential source of regional social networks, which have
been identified as important channels to access resources crucial for starting
and operating a firm successfully (Sorenson 2003).
3 Approach and data
The general methodology adopted below is that of an explorative case study
(Eisenhardt 1989). As is typical for this approach, we draw on a variety of
kinds and sources of data, in particular interviews, survey methods and archival
material. Our empirical research builds on an earlier project that focused on
regional determinants of entrepreneurial activities in Jena (Fornahl 2007).
As part of that project, which did not specifically target software firms, 24
interviews with local experts, managers and entrepreneurs were conducted.
Additionally, a postal survey of 93 regional firms was performed.
For the present project, we initiated a new wave of empirical research
activities in 2005/2006. We began by collecting publicly available material
on the development of Intershop. Given our interest in spin-off activities, a
list of spin-off firms was generated next (cf. Tables 1 and 2). In compiling
and updating2 this list, we relied on public resources such as media reports,
2The final list (cf. Tables 1 and 2) reflects the spin-off population as of 2007/2008.
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corporate web sites and online network platforms, which we complemented
by information directly obtained from former Intershop employees.
Following the suggestions of Eisenhardt (1989), we then chose a strategic
subset of spin-off founders and other local industry experts with whom we
conducted extensive, semi-structured interviews. We primarily focused on the
founders of spin-offs located in Jena, and made sure to exploit the whole
spectrum of founder backgrounds and spin-off types (cf. Eisenhardt 1989,
pp. 536–7). Specifically, our field research covered the new entrepreneurial
activities of Intershop’s founding team and the spin-offs organized by former
members of the firm’s top-tier management, but also several spin-off founders
who held more marginal positions and had shorter employment spells at the
parent firm. In total, 12 spin-off founders were interviewed, covering almost
half the local spin-off population. The number of interviews allowed for sub-
stantial triangulation, enabling us to sort out general dimensions of the spin-off
process from those aspects that only apply to specific cases or substantially
differ between individual spin-off firms. To get a more encompassing view
of the local industry, we conducted additional interviews with founders and
managers of other local software firms, as well as with an academic computer
scientist working for the local university. Further interviews were conducted in
2007/2008 to trace new developments after the first round of interviews. The
typical interview lasted 1–2 h.
The focus on interviews with spin-off founders is in line with Schoenberger
(1981), who points out that corporate interviews are particularly valuable in
accounting for the situational complexity generally faced by decision makers
in firms. Especially in contexts with changing organizational and regional
structures or processes, interviews are a suitable research strategy to identify
the driving forces underlying these dynamics. We utilized the interviews both
to test causal relationships suggested in the existing literature and to develop
new conjectures on the spin-off process and regional industrial dynamics.
Our theory-building approach thus follows the iterative process described by
Eisenhardt (1989).
4 The rise and fall of Intershop
Intershop Communications AG was a poster child of the German “new econ-
omy.” Founded 2 years after German reunification in the formerly socialist
East, the maker of e-commerce software for providers of online shops initially
was an impressive success story that attained nationwide prominence. Since the
end of the dot-com boom, Intershop has been struggling for survival. While
laying off the majority of its workforce, it has lost large amounts of investor
money.
Intershop was started in 1992 by Stephan Schambach, Karsten Schneider
and Wilfried Beeck under the name NetConsult Communications GmbH.
In the beginning, the firm primarily sold computer hardware and networks.
Schambach had grown up in East Germany. Dropping out of his studies at the
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University of Jena, he started to sell home-assembled computers even before
Germany was reunited (Virtel 2001). Schneider likewise was an East German
native; he had worked as an electrical engineer with the local Carl Zeiss
company. After the end of socialism, Schneider briefly ran a used-car business
before joining a small computer firm. Finally, Beeck was a West German
computer scientist who had accumulated substantial prior entrepreneurial
experience before co-founding Intershop. Beeck had started his first software
firm in 1983 and was distributing Steve Jobs’s NeXt Computers when he joined
forces with Schambach and Schneider to start Intershop.
Intershop’s development into a producer of e-commerce software began
in 1994 when, based on an idea by Schambach, the firm integrated its in-
ternal order processing system into the Internet (Berberich 1999). The firm
subsequently specialized on web-related software development. In 1995, it
introduced Intershop Online, the first standard software for e-commerce appli-
cations. One year later, Intershop was the first German software firm to attract
VC funding (ibid.). It was thus able to grow rapidly. Intershop subsequently
tried to attain market leadership in e-commerce software, a strategy that
at the time convinced many growth-oriented analysts and investors. To be
closer to the crucial U.S. market, it relocated its corporate headquarter to San
Francisco.
In 1998 Intershop went public on the German Neuer Markt3 and subse-
quently also on NASDAQ. Its stock price skyrocketed (cf. Fig. 1). At one
point, the firm had a market value of more than Euro 11.1 billion (March
10, 2000). Intershop’s revenues increased from Euro 0.54 million in 1996 to
nearly Euro 123 million in 2000, while its worldwide employment rose from 43
to 1,218 in the same period (cf. Table 3). The firm was widely regarded as a
bluechip among the German “new economy” firms. In February 2000, the U.S.
magazine Business Week ran a story on Intershop titled “Germany’s Hot Star,”
which likened the Jena startup to Hewlett-Packard in its early days (Echikson
2000).
A crucial ingredient of Intershop’s standing among analysts and investors
was that, in contrast to many other German startups, it had early on focused
on its presence in the U.S. market. During that time, Intershop claimed
global leadership in the e-commerce market. Co-founder Stephan Schambach
attained celebrity status as a successful German high-tech entrepreneur, and
Intershop executives were sought-after experts to comment on policy discus-
sions covering issues such as entrepreneurship, the Internet and even immigra-
tion policy. In 2000, the firm’s local operations were moved to Jena’s tallest
building, a 150-m glass tower. Originally constructed as a socialist prestige
project, this building was renamed Intershop Tower and remodeled into an
office building custom-equipped for the needs of an IT firm.
3The Neuer Markt was a growth- and technology-oriented segment of the German Stock Exchange
started in 1997 and closed down in 2003. Intershop was the first East German startup to be listed
on the Neuer Markt.
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Fig. 1 Development of the
intershop communications


















































* The bars represent the average stock prices in that quarter of the year based on
the stock prices on the first days of each month in the quarter.
Intershop’s public image soon started to change. Beginning in April 2000,
its stock price declined dramatically (cf. Fig. 1). On a single day early in 2001
the firm lost 70% of its stock market value. Lawsuits by frustrated investors
and criminal prosecution ensued. In the following years, all three founders
resigned from Intershop’s active management. Beeck left Intershop in 2002,
Schneider in 2003. Also in 2003 Schambach resigned as CEO. The position was
taken over by then CFO Jürgen Schöttler, an economics PhD and experienced
“old economy” executive (Klawitter 2003). Subsequently, Schambach retired
from Intershop’s management altogether and, as did his former co-founders,
engaged in new entrepreneurial activities (see Section 5 below).
After the stock market crash, Intershop declined further. Revenues, R&D
investments and employment all decreased strongly from 2000 to 2006
(cf. Table 3). To save money, Intershop’s corporate headquarter was moved
back from San Francisco to Jena in 2002, and branch offices outside Europe
and the U.S were shut down. A large number of employees were laid off or left
the firm on their own initiative, with staff numbers falling to little more than
200 employees. Likewise, annual revenues decreased to below Euro 20 million
2004–2006. To date, the company has never been profitable on an annual basis.
Table 3 Intershop financial and employment data, 1996–2007 (not including media costs of online
marketing; source: intershop communications AG, annual reports 1997–2007)
Year Revenue Profit/loss R&D investment Total
(e million) (e million) (e million) employment
1996 0.538 −2.656 0.341 43
1997 5.036 −7.956 1.000 179
1998 17.872 −17.308 4.377 353
1999 46.300 −18.400 7.115 544
2000 122.994 −38.900 10.191 1,218
2001 68.654 −131.798 15.179 733
2002 45.097 −27.555 7.225 479
2003 23.159 −18.640 6.260 371
2004 17.568 −8.776 4.149 260
2005 17.792 −3.312 2.765 222
2006 18.817 −6.390 3.177 247
2007 26.911 −2.033 2.977 233
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A widespread assessment shared by our interview partners is that Inter-
shop’s software products were of high quality, while the firm had major
management weaknesses, particularly in the marketing field. Moreover, in
retrospect, Intershop’s strategic orientation toward the high-end segment of
the e-commerce software market has been criticized. Intershop’s flagship
product “Enfinity” may have been too complex for the IT capabilities of many
potential customers (Von Bredow and Jung 2001).
While shrinking the firm to a sustainable size, Intershop’s new management
tried to safeguard the firm’s future prospects by bringing in fresh capital as
well as strengthening the marketing and sales divisions. Intershop’s license rev-
enues from existing customer accounts, which include names such as Hewlett
Packard, Deutsche Telekom and Otto, are still substantial, but consulting
services account for most of its income. The company has recently entered into
two new lines of business: First, online marketing activities were commenced
through the acquisition of SoQuero GmbH in 2006. Second, a new full service
e-commerce business model allows customers to outsource their complete
e-commerce activities including payments, logistics and the handling of
returns. Most recently, Intershop’s employment and sales seem to have
stabilized. Positive earnings were reported in the first quarter of 2008.
5 New entrepreneurial activities of Intershop’s founding team
As was indicated in the previous section, all three members of Intershop’s
founding team had prior entrepreneurial experience when they started Inter-
shop. It was also noted above that all three left the firm’s management after
2001. Since then, they have all engaged in renewed entrepreneurial activities.
Wilfried Beeck’s departure from Intershop involved a fissioning of the firm.
As part of its downsizing, Intershop had decided to focus its activities on
the high-end Enfinity software, and to sell the rights in Intershop 4, which
derived from the firm’s original product and was targeted to SMEs and hosting
providers. Beeck initially tried to find a buyer for Intershop 4. When these
attempts failed, he was offered to take over Intershop 4 himself, as well as the
existing customer accounts. Beeck then transferred the rights in Intershop 4 to
a firm named ePages, which is the legal successor of an earlier firm he started
back in the 1980s. EPages attracted a number of former Intershop employees,
and in addition to the founder, two out of four top management team members
had an Intershop background. While ePages has its headquarter and sales
office in Beeck’s home town, Hamburg, Jena is the location of its development
activities with 44 local employees.
Beeck’s departure from Intershop is indicative of a disagreement on strat-
egy. His assessment of the market potential of Intershop 4 differed from that
of the other owners who favored a concentration on the Enfinity software
(Toparkus 2004). Notwithstanding its focus on smaller-sized customer firms,
ePages continued to upgrade its product, for example by enabling its inte-
gration into Internet marketplaces such as eBay. In 2004, with ePages 5, an
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entirely new product was introduced. A major element of ePages’ business
is the development of software for online rental shops offered by hosting
providers.
Pixaco was started by Karsten Schneider in 2003. Pixaco’s business model
was to provide a web portal allowing customers to upload digital image files for
professional printing. The firm originated from the Bilderservice.de web por-
tal, which was first started in 1999 by Creative Online Systems (later renamed
into Vimago), an Intershop partner firm located in nearby Weimar, on the
basis of Intershop’s e-commerce software. Already before Pixaco was started,
the digital photo processing facilities associated with Bilderservice.de were
moved to the Intershop Tower in Jena. Given its heavy data traffic, the tower’s
sophisticated IT infrastructure was a major asset for Pixaco (Querengaesser
2004).
Former Vimago employees, including its software architect, joined Pixaco’s
initial management team. The new firm discontinued further development of
the Bilderservice.de portal. Instead, it created a new, user-friendly portal to
reach the end consumer market. In December 2005, Pixaco was acquired by
Hewlett-Packard in a trade sale. Subsequently, it has been fully integrated into
Snapfish, Hewlett-Packard’s online photo service subsidiary.
Following the acquisition, Schneider became Snapfish’s managing direc-
tor, and the Pixaco facilities became Snapfish’s headquarters for Continen-
tal Europe. In 2007 Schneider withdrew from Snapfish to engage in new
entrepreneurial activities. He first started Argiv, a private investment firm
targeting early-stage investments related to IT and web services. Later in the
year, Schneider announced the formation of AdiCash, a VC-backed company
developing a payback system for e-commerce transactions.
In contrast to the other two Intershop founders, Stephan Schambach started
his new firm, Demandware, outside Jena and Germany. Demandware was
organized in 2004 and located in the Boston region. Its business model is to
combine e-commerce software development with on-demand software distri-
bution (also known as software-as-a-service), which Schambach saw as the
emerging dominant distribution model for business software. With on-demand
software, customers do not install the program on their own computers, but
rent computing time on the provider’s computers. License fees are based on
actual use rather than flat rates. Convinced of the new distribution model,
Schambach initially attempted to change Intershop’s strategic orientation to-
ward the on-demand concept. Schambach suggests that he resorted to starting
a new firm only when he could not implement the proposed changes to
Intershop’s business model because of massive resistance within the existing
organization.
Demandware aspires to become the leading producer of on-demand e-
commerce software and possibly also a leading platform for business software
more generally. It is VC-backed and employs a number of former Intershop
employees. Most notably, the firm hired Intershop’s former chief software
architect, Ulrike Mueller, who was leading the development of its Enfinity
software. With currently 120 employees, Demandware is the largest of all new
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firms spawned by Intershop. Even though it located far from its roots, De-
mandware cooperates with Intershop spin-offs located in Jena, as well as with
long-term Intershop partner Deutsche Telekom.
The new ventures of the Intershop founders were strongly influenced by
their earlier experiences at Intershop. Both Beeck and Schambach remained
active in Intershop’s core market – development of e-commerce software –
with their new firms. Even though they focus on different market segments,
both firms represent a competitive challenge to at least some of Intershop’s
business. The strategic differences between the two new firms are pronounced.
EPages builds on Intershop’s early success, keeping its software affordable
for smaller-scale customers. The firm stresses its profitability rather than its
growth potential. Its strategy is more conservative than that of Demandware,
which, similar to Intershop in its early days, strives to pioneer a new software
market that promises substantial opportunities for growth. With Demandware,
Schambach moreover repeated Intershop’s strategy of locating in the U.S., the
global center of the e-commerce market.
Pixaco differed from the other firms in that it was not (primarily) a software
developer but rather provided a web-based service. The Intershop impact
on this firm is nonetheless discernible. Pixaco’s web portal was based on
Intershop software. Schneider’s ability to grasp the opportunity presented by
Bilderservice.de and to use it as the foundation of a new firm further reflects his
Intershop experience. With Argiv, the discovery of opportunities has become
the cornerstone of Schneider’s activities. Finally, AdiCash pursues a novel
business that, similar to Pixaco, combines e-commerce with a service that
previously existed in traditional markets.
6 Employee spin-offs and a self-organized technology park
In addition to the new ventures started by Intershop’s founding team, other
firm members also engaged in entrepreneurial activities after leaving In-
tershop. While the origins of some spin-offs predate Intershop’s problems,
the firm’s downsizing induced a number of its employees to start their own
businesses, and spin-off activities were also encouraged by the Intershop
management.
No complete listing of Intershop spin-offs exists. However, based on various
online resources, local information, and personal communication, a minimum
of 35 new firms started by former Intershop employees (in addition to the five
firms discussed above) could be identified (cf. Table 1 for details).4 Eighteen
of the 35 are spin-offs in the strict sense of having entered into software
development and/or offering web-based services. Another nine firms provide
consulting services, which is of little surprise given low barriers to entry in that
4This number does not include a number of ex-Intershop employees who work as free-lance
software developers.
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industry. Further adding to the firms started by former Intershop employees,
the first three “second-generation” spin-offs have recently been organized by
spin-off employees who never worked for Intershop themselves (cf. Table 2).
6.1 Employee learning and the business models of the spin-offs
Only a single employee spin-off (Ageto, which subsequently became part
of Canada-based Truition) entered in the same industry segment (i.e.,
e-commerce software development) that Intershop, as well as two of the
founders’ new firms (Demandware and ePages), are active in. Ageto/Truition
concentrates on a specific kind of e-commerce software, enabling the inte-
gration of e-commerce activities and online auction platforms such as Ebay.
In a similar way, most other spin-offs follow strategies that are related to
e-commerce, but depart substantially from the parent firm’s business model.
The business models of many spin-offs indicate these firms exploit specific
knowledge that their founders gained at Intershop. Xceptance, co-founded by
Intershop’s former head of quality control and its legal advisor, develops and
markets quality tests and automation techniques for software quality control.
The founder of Mokkafish, which started by developing user interfaces, was in
charge of interface design at Intershop. Similarly, J-media, which produced a
standardized software supporting marketing and PR activities, was organized
by a former member of Intershop’s communication department. A direct
connection between the jobs they held at Intershop and the focus of their new
ventures can also be drawn for some of the employees who started consulting
firms. For example, TowerConsult, the firm organized by Intershop’s former
director of human resources, offers recruiting services, whereas the former
company spokesman started a PR agency. Likewise, one co-founder of Client-
house, which concentrates on customer relation management consulting, was
responsible for customer and partner services at Intershop.
Another clearly discernible aspect of the Intershop spin-offs is the ability
of their founders to leverage contacts and to discover business opportunities
related to software development and online services. Both Ageto/Truition and
ePages are working to integrate e-commerce and online marketplaces. Alea,
co-founded by Intershop’s one-time chief software architect, Frank Gessner,
develops integrated business software for mail-order firms. Its product is based
on programs developed in an earlier firm of Gessner’s co-founder (Clemens
2006). Alea is thus similar to Pixaco in adopting and further developing a
business model that is related to Intershop’s activities but had previously
been developed outside the firm. The founder of Synchronity, which focuses
on software for “e-government” applications (e-business solutions for the
public sector), had held project management and software development jobs
at Intershop before joining a public bank administering subsidized lending
programs. Synchronity’s initial product accordingly was a web-based solution
for the administration of such programs.
Altogether, those members of Intershop who were most central to its strate-
gic management developed the business models that are most closely related
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to that of the parent firm. Two of the firms started by Intershop’s founders but
only a single employee spin-off are developing e-commerce software that is at
least in part competing with Intershop’s own products. Moreover, comparing
the business models pursued by firms started at different points in time, some
differences can be noted. In particular, several of the most recent spin-offs are
providers of online contents rather than upstream software developers such as
Intershop and most of its early spin-offs.
The impression emerging from the business models – spin-offs entering
in market segments and activities that reflect their founders’ positions and
projects at the parent firm – was reinforced by our interviews with spin-off
founders. Interviewees frequently emphasized the continuity between their
projects at Intershop and the subsequent spin-off activities, as well as the
importance of specific skills acquired in their prior jobs. For example, one
interviewed founder not only noted that he was still active in the same field
of activity as in his time at Intershop, but that the same would also hold true
for other spin-offs. Another founder characterized the software development
expertise he had gained at Intershop as a “repertoire that I am still building
upon.”
This evidence for substantial employee learning enabling spin-off activities
begs the question how Intershop was able to develop high-quality software
in the first place. Its founders brought little prior expertise in software de-
velopment. Likewise, many employees came without degrees in computer
science (often dropping out from university for their job at Intershop), or
even without any background in software development. Our interviewees
suggested that Intershop’s early entry into the e-commerce business, coupled
with fortunate initial hiring decisions for key R&D positions, explains the
firm’s ability to develop its technological capabilities. Moreover, not all of
the skills that future spin-off founders acquired at Intershop were related to
software development. Rather, the importance of programming capabilities
acquired at Intershop varied according to the position that the founder had
occupied (and consequently the spin-offs’ business models also differed).
Another dimension of learning was frequently stressed in the interviews: the
importance of having gained work experience in a fast-growing, internationally
active entrepreneurial firm. Besides lacking software-related expertise, many
Intershop employees, including ones who later started spin-offs, joined the firm
without any prior job experience. Our interviewees consistently emphasized
the autonomy and room for experimentation that had characterized their
Intershop jobs. Relatively junior employees handled large-scale projects and
were delegated staff-supervision responsibilities. Also, working at Intershop
often involved the management of international projects, an aspect that was
particularly relevant for the majority of employees who had grown up in
the isolation of pre-1990 socialist East Germany. In this way, Intershop’s
management practices and its corporate culture apparently were conducive to
the later spin-off activities.
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In contrast, none of the interviewed spin-off founders confirmed that the
role model provided by the Intershop founders had significantly affected their
own decision to start a firm. A positive role model effect might have been
expected in light of the prominence that Schambach and (to a lesser extent)
the other founders had attained, and also the substantial wealth accumulated
by them. Evidence of a role model effect was indeed found in an earlier
study of entrepreneurial activities in Jena (Fornahl 2007; also see Section 7
below). It would moreover help to explain why so many Intershop employees
became entrepreneurs, even though they had mostly been socialized in the
anti-capitalist environment of pre-1990 East Germany.
It is conceivable that the negative answers were due to a role model effect
that operated below the level of conscious reflection, so that our interviewees
were not aware of its impact on their behavior. In this case, the importance of a
role model effect cannot fully be evaluated. Another possibility is that, because
most spin-off activities of Intershop employees took place after 2000, the
Intershop founders had lost much of their attractiveness as role models. Some
evidence furthermore suggests that Eastern Germany’s socialist past had little
constraining effect on the entrepreneurial activities coming out of Intershop.
The younger Intershop employees had been teenagers in the post-reunification
period when substantial entrepreneurial activities took place in the East as
part of the transition to a market economy (Fritsch 2004). Some of the older
employees who started spin-offs had engaged in entrepreneurial activities even
before joining Intershop. More generally, during its rapid growth, Intershop
had hired employees with rather diverse professional backgrounds. Their
biographies often suggest they had not fully subscribed to socialist ideals.
In addition to the skills acquired through on-the-job learning, the entrepre-
neurial activities of ex-Intershop employees also benefited in a very direct way
from the parent firm’s temporary financial success. Even though we did not
collect systematic data on the interviewees’ personal wealth, several respon-
dents acknowledged that money from trading Intershop stock had enabled
their own spin-off activities, as well as those of other founders. In individual
cases, supplier contracts with the parent firm were important to overcoming
initial difficulties. Most of the spin-offs started out on a small scale and without
VC backing. However, there were substantial cross-investments among the
spin-off founders. These investment activities have become more explicit
through the recent organization of investment firms such as Argiv, Constancy,
and the TowerVenture cooperative (see below).
6.2 Cooperation among the spin-offs
Intershop played an active role in enabling the entrepreneurial activities of its
former employees. When the firm began to lay off employees at a large scale,
it utilized a German law allowing for publicly subsidized transfer firms. Under
that law, the laid-off employees received a publicly funded transfer income
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(roughly corresponding to unemployment benefits), while Intershop had to
cover both social insurance payments and re-training costs. Intershop’s former
director of human resources suggests that this institutional arrangement was
more costly than the alternative of just laying off the respective employees,
even including litigation and settlement costs that could be expected to arise
in the latter case. Part of Intershop’s motivation to incur these costs was to
retain software competences in the region. From the beginning, it was expected
that some of the employees shifted to the transfer firm would engage in
entrepreneurial activities.
The transfer firm became the nucleus of the TowerByte cooperative of
software firms organized late in 2003. TowerByte’s members are start-ups
engaged in various types of activities related to e-commerce. The cooperative
currently has 28 member firms with an aggregate employment of 280. Fifteen
member firms are Intershop spin-offs, but the cooperative also attracted
startups the founders of which have no Intershop background. The individual
firms focus on different submarkets and services. Accordingly, they are not
directly competing with each other.
The TowerByte cooperative provides a number of services to its member
firms. It rents office space in the Intershop Tower, which is occupied by the
member firms. The firms are thus able to benefit from the building’s IT and
service infrastructure, as well as from the proximity to Intershop, ePages,
Snapfish (which are all located in the Tower) and the other member firms. As
a consequence of the available technological infrastructure and services, new
firms can start small and quickly. In addition, the cooperative pools resources
in the purchases of supplies and the provision of business services.
Since the TowerByte members differ in their specific competences, they are
able to help each other by providing specific expertise, access to customers, and
small-scale loans (Kalla 2005). Our interview partners from the cooperative
stressed the role of information flows among the member firms. They also sug-
gested that the proximity to other software firms makes it easier for member
firms to hire new employees, since the availability of alternative employers
significantly reduces the risk of joining a small startup. The larger size of
the cooperation is also seen as a valuable signal of credibility to customers,
enhancing their willingness to do business with the mostly small member firms.
The TowerByte cooperative thus operates like a well-functioning, software-
specific technology park. It is special, however, in that it is based on private
initiative rather than public policy and receives only modest public subsidies.
As was acknowledged by our interview partners, the high degree of self-
sufficiency is largely due to the low capitalization required to start a software
firm. Capital was nonetheless identified as a potential bottleneck limiting
the number and growth of software startups. Accordingly, building on the
experience of the TowerByte cooperative, an investment cooperative named
TowerVenture was organized in 2007 to support IT-related entrepreneurial
ventures in the broader Jena region. The members of this cooperative are
mostly founders of Intershop spin-offs.
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7 Beyond spin-offs: Intershop’s effect on regional development
In the previous sections, we demonstrated how the rise and subsequent
decline of Intershop enabled a wave of entrepreneurial activities by former
firm members. Through the spin-off activities emerging from Intershop, a
substantial number of new software firms were created in its home region. In
the present section, we discuss additional effects that Intershop may have had
on the development of a regional software industry. Guided by the literature
on industrial clusters, we focus on three relevant dimensions: human capital
formation, regional cooperation, and the provision of entrepreneurial role
models to the broader public.
Intershop’s growth strongly increased the pool of software-related human
capital in Jena, which, except for a few small companies catering to the techni-
cal software needs of the local manufacturing firms, did not have a substantial
prior software industry. Intershop’s local employment in Jena peaked at some
700 jobs, with the remaining employment largely being divided between San
Francisco and Hamburg, where the financial operations were concentrated.
Jena has always been the center of product development, and, accordingly,
the local Intershop employment was biased toward programmers and software
developers. According to Intershop’s former director of human resources,
most of them came from the broader region. University graduates with degrees
in computer science were predominantly hired from the surrounding Technical
Universities in Leipzig, Ilmenau, Chemnitz and Dresden.
For the local pool of human capital, capabilities that employees acquired on
their jobs at Intershop may have been even more important than the firm’s re-
cruitment of computer scientists. As was noted above, the firm hired numerous
employees who had no software-related education or job experience, including
university students who had not finished their degrees. In this context, the high
quality of Intershop’s software development was crucial, as it helped to provide
a fertile learning environment for acquiring programming skills, particularly
in the emerging field of e-commerce software. In line with this conjecture,
one spin-off founder characterized Intershop as a “breeder of e-commerce
competences.”
When Intershop laid off almost 500 employees in Jena, this pool of software-
related human capital was accessible not only to its spin-offs, but also to
other firms in the region. Our interviewees suggested that indeed many of the
employees, particularly those coming from the broader region, attempted to
stay in Jena. Official labor market statistics are consistent with this characteri-
zation. The number of skilled IT employees (“Datenverarbeitungsfachleute”)
approximately doubled in Jena from 1994 to 2001 (Fig. 2).5 This positive
development coincided with the growth of Intershop. In contrast, the subse-
5With this rate of increase in IT employment, Jena was substantially above the German average
in these years.
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Fig. 2 IT employees in Jena
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* Note that not all Intershop employees are classified as IT employees and that 
they were not all located in Jena.
quent downsizing of Intershop’s activities is not reflected in the labor market
figures, which largely remained stable after the burst of the dot-com bubble.
In addition to the Intershop spin-offs (which between them have created more
than 300 jobs locally), former Intershop employees found new employment in
existing firms outside the IT sector, and also in new software startups, including
those member firms of the TowerByte cooperative that are not Intershop
spin-offs.
There is growing evidence indicating that the availability of human capital
and the emerging local software industry induces existing firms to move to
the region. T-Systems MMS, a multimedia service subsidiary of Deutsche
Telekom, opened a branch office in Jena, which hired a number of former
Intershop employees and is led by an ex-Intershop manager. T-Systems MMS
cooperates with Intershop and several of its spin-offs; it is the German dis-
tribution partner of Demandware. In a similar way, Nexum AG, an online
marketing consulting firm located in Cologne, has opened an office in Jena.
Ifolor, an online photo service from Switzerland, chose Jena as the location of
its German subsidiary and hired a former Snapfish manager to head it.
Theories of regional industry agglomeration also emphasize the role of
knowledge spillovers and cooperation in local networks. Our interviews sug-
gest that during its growth, Intershop was not connected well in the region.
Several interviewees characterized Intershop as a less-than-ideal partner for
cooperation. Given its ambitious objectives, the firm shunned potential part-
ners from the region, including the local university, in favor of interregional
and international cooperation partners. It was also suggested that Intershop’s
corporate culture was ill-suited for cooperating with public research. This is
consistent with Intershop’s failed attempt to endow a chair for e-commerce at
the local university, which was intended to form the nucleus of a new program
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in economics and computer science (Uni-Journal Jena, June 2000). This failure
was not only caused by the lack of funds after the burst of the dot-com bubble,
but also by a “clash of cultures” between the firm’s management and the
regulations governing the university’s appointments. Apparently, Intershop
became more open toward regional cooperation only when its crisis had al-
ready set in. Interviewees nonetheless suggested that, at present, the Intershop
spin-offs are more relevant as cooperation partners than the parent firm itself.
Finally, it is conceivable that the temporary success of Intershop influenced
general attitudes toward entrepreneurship in the region and the ensuing will-
ingness to start firms, as its founders may have provided positive role models
for potential entrepreneurs (Fornahl 2007). Consistent with this conjecture, in
a series of expert interviews on entrepreneurship in Jena conducted in 2001, 14
out of 24 experts mentioned Schambach as an individual who affected local
entrepreneurial activities. Evidence supporting the notion that the regional
entrepreneurial climate influenced firm formation also emerged from a survey
of 93 founders or managers of local startups organized between 1990 and
2001 (ibid., pp. 195–211). Two-thirds of the respondents confirmed that a
positive entrepreneurial climate had been a relevant factor in their decision
to start a firm. In addition, one-third of the firm representatives answered
that earlier regional founders had positively influenced them.6 In contrast to
these self-reports, however, no quantifiable effect of Intershop’s example on
subsequent firm formation in Jena was found in the survey. Neither positive
founding decisions nor the actual formation of startups were correlated with
the respondents’ ex-post assessment of the regional entrepreneurial climate at
the respective time (ibid.).7
8 Discussion: Intershop and its spin-offs
Our empirical analysis focused on the entrepreneurial activities of Intershop’s
founders and employees. In the present section, we discuss the findings from
the case study in the context of the prior work on spin-offs and spin-off-based
regional clustering.
What lessons about the spin-off process can we derive from the Intershop
case? In line with prior literature, the business models of the Intershop spin-
6No respondent indicated a negative impact of earlier firm formation. This asymmetry may reflect
sample bias due to the restriction to firms that were actually started.
7There exists, however, a rather illustrative piece of anecdotal evidence for Intershop’s effect as
a regional role model. A short-lived software firm named Exquisit Technologies was started in
Jena in 2000. It focused on speech recognition software, and its founders explicitly acknowledged
Intershop as a role model (Financial Times Deutschland, October 17, 2000). In addition, the
firm’s name itself indicates the Intershop influence. To see this, one needs to know that the name
Intershop not only alludes to “internet” and “shopping,” but was also the name of the chain of
state-run shops that sold Western merchandise (for Western currency) in socialist East Germany.
Likewise, Exquisit was the name of shops that sold the highest-quality goods available for Eastern
currency.
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offs show that their founders made use of specific experiences and knowledge
accumulated while working for Intershop. This impression was confirmed in
the interviews. An additional aspect is that those founders who were closest to
Intershop’s strategic decision making (in particular the founders themselves)
started the firms the activities of which are closest to the parent firm’s markets.
Adding to recent findings linking the success of spin-offs to their founders’
positions at the parent firm (Dahl and Reichstein 2006), our study therefore
indicates that differences in position at the parent firm not only affect the
quality of the acquired knowledge, but also its nature and the relative impor-
tance assigned to various kinds of experiences and capabilities. The business
models of the Intershop spin-offs are furthermore informative with regard to
the parent-spin-off relationship. Since, depending on their position, employees
acquire specific and in part idiosyncratic capabilities, their entrepreneurial
strategies will often differ from the parent firm’s business model, thus limiting
the extent to which they become its competitors.
It also emerged from the interviews that the general experience of working
in a fast-growing, entrepreneurial startup was highly valuable for the subse-
quent spin-off activities. The spin-off founders’ emphasis on the importance of
having learned how to run large-scale projects and lead teams resonates with
the notion of an “entrepreneurial career imprint,” which has been proposed to
explain why a large number of managers hired to lead young startups in the
emerging U.S. biotech industry came from a single medical products company,
Baxter International (Higgins 2005). According to this account, Baxter was
similar to Intershop in that it assigned challenging and highly autonomous jobs
to its junior executives. They were thus put in a good position to acquire the
skills needed to run startup firms. However, while the “Baxter Boys” joined
existing young firms, the founders of Intershop’s spin-offs started new firms
themselves.8
Prima facie, the Intershop case is less easily reconciled with the “success
breeds success” dynamics characterizing the spin-off process, where better
incumbents tend to have more and better spin-offs. There are several ways,
however, to account for the large number of Intershop spin-offs in spite of the
weak performance of the parent firm, which essentially has been struggling for
survival since 2001.
To begin with, Intershop’s crisis may have induced employees to form spin-
offs that would not have considered entrepreneurial activities under more
favorable employment conditions. In the classification proposed by Buenstorf
(2007b), many of Intershop’s spin-offs were “necessity” rather than “oppor-
tunity” spin-offs, because the primary impetus for their formation was the
8The finding that young firms tend to have more spin-offs than older, more bureaucratic firms
(Gompers et al. 2005) is also consistent with our results.
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deterioration of career prospects in the parent firm (combined with a shortage
of alternative employment options in the region). This holds particularly
for those employees who started new ventures out of the transfer firm that
Intershop initiated during its downsizing. In this context, it is notable that,
in contrast to the theory proposed by Klepper and Thompson (2006), several
interviewees discounted the role of strategic disagreements as a factor in their
spin-off decision. Given Intershop’s precarious situation after 2000, necessity-
based spin-off activities apparently did not require conflicts as further triggers.
At the same time, strategic disagreements were crucial for two of the three
ventures started by Intershop’s founders, ePages and Demandware. The latter
case shows that even the founder/CEO of an established firm may be unable
to pursue a radically new strategy within the existing organization.
On a related note, Intershop was a pioneering early entrant into e-
commerce software development, and its products were highly regarded for
their quality. The firm thus seems to accord to the account of spin-off
generation given by Agarwal et al. (2004). Technological capabilities were
developed in the firm, but given its fragile situation after 2001, Intershop
was unable to exploit the ensuing opportunities, thus creating a potential for
employees to start spin-offs. Since it had little prospect of broadening the
range of its activities, these spin-offs – except when entering into the core
e-commerce market itself – did not threaten to become competitors of the
parent firm. Intershop could therefore “afford” to support their emergence,
as is indicated by its sponsoring of the transfer firm that evolved into the
TowerByte cooperative.
Finally, specific characteristics of the software industry, both in terms of its
life cycle and in terms of product design, may have added to the propensity
of spin-off formation in the Intershop case. Because of the sudden end of
the dot-com boom, with Intershop, a firm was downsizing that belonged to
the technological vanguard in a young industry with low barriers to entry.
This contrasts with the frequent pattern that the decline or exit of industry
incumbents is part of a more general industry shakeout. In the latter situation,
there are much fewer opportunities for starting successful spin-offs.
Software is moreover a prime example of heterogeneous and modular prod-
uct design. In the laser industry, which is also characterized by heterogeneous
submarkets, specialization along submarkets has been found to favor spin-
off entry (Klepper and Sleeper 2005; Buenstorf 2007a). The same seems to
hold for the software industry. Product modularity is likewise favorable to the
formation of spin-offs, in particular since modularity was a significant aspect
of the alleged quality of Intershop’s software products. Modularity is relevant
for the spin-off process, as it allows for entry by horizontal or vertical disinte-
gration, i.e. specialization on some specific aspect of the software product or
its development.
How did the entrepreneurial activities of Intershop’s founders and employ-
ees affect the firm’s home region? Most spin-offs entered at the location where
their founders had been active. As Intershop had established various regional
branch offices, this was not always Jena, but still roughly two-thirds of the new
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firms (25) located in Jena and another four entered within a 100-km range. This
conforms to the oft-observed pattern that entrepreneurs stay in their home
region when starting a new firm (Cooper and Folta 2000; Fornahl and Graf
2003).
The local entrants created new jobs, thus helping to retain in the re-
gion a substantial fraction of the software-related human capital that had
been brought in and/or bred by Intershop. Between the parent firm and
the spin-offs, the current number of jobs amounts to about three-quarters
of Intershop’s peak local employment. In fact, even though Jena remains a
high-unemployment region, our interviewees suggested that their firms’ future
growth prospects may be limited by a shortage of trained software developers.
However, Demandware, the most ambitious of the Intershop spin-offs,
located far from its geographical roots. Demandware’s direct effects are prob-
ably detrimental to the region, because the firm is a competitor of Intershop as
well as ePages, and also attracted human capital away from Jena. At the same
time, the firm cooperates with some of Intershop’s employee spin-offs, which
may give rise to some positive indirect effects on the region.
The tendency of spin-offs to locate in their home region is a key compo-
nent of the spin-off-based account of cluster formation (Klepper 2007, 2008;
Buenstorf and Klepper 2008). The present analysis confirms this tendency for
the Intershop case. More importantly, our findings provide further clues for
understanding how spin-offs shape regional industrial dynamics. Because of
the differences in their on-the-job-learning experiences, the ventures started
by the different spin-off founders also differ in their business models and
strategies. As a consequence, they are generally not competing for the same
customers, but often offer vertically or horizontally related products and
services. Combined with the shared experience of having worked in the same
firm, and the ensuing familiarity with each other’s strengths and weaknesses,
spin-off founders have access to a localized network of capabilities, skills, and
financial capital that they can employ to mutual benefit.
Indeed, while our interviewees dismissed the importance of Intershop’s
regional cooperation, the importance of the network of spin-off firms was
frequently stressed, both within the TowerByte cooperative and beyond.
Furthermore, the presence of several employers specializing in similar seg-
ments of the software industry reduces the hazard of job losses for potential
employees. The interactions between spin-offs thus seem to conform closely to
the conventional theories of Marshallian agglomeration economies stressing
knowledge spillovers, labor pooling and vertical relationships within clusters.
In this case, at least, the spin-off process seems to have been the key to
cluster emergence, providing the foundation on which performance-enhancing
interactions between firms could develop. Thus, the self-augmenting character
of the spin-off process is further reinforced by increasingly powerful external
effects of agglomeration. To the extent they are mediated by network mem-
bership, the benefits of these external effects would be restricted to former
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Intershop employees and their entrepreneurial activities. Interestingly, though,
with the TowerByte cooperative, an institutional framework was established
that enhances the accessibility of localized knowledge and other benefits,
extending it to startups whose founding context was unrelated to Intershop.
9 Conclusion: from dot-com to regional software industry
From an investor’s point of view, Intershop, similar to many other dot-com
firms, was a bad long-term investment. Our objective in the present article
was to qualify this assessment by adopting a regional perspective and tracing
Intershop’s regional legacy 7 years after the end of the dot-com boom. We
identified key elements of the spin-off-based account of cluster formation in
the Intershop case. Intershop was an early entrant into e-commerce software,
and there were no systematic reasons other than the founders’ biographies
why it emerged in Jena and not elsewhere. Intershop’s growth attracted human
capital to the region and enabled employee learning. Subsequent spin-off for-
mation by the Intershop founders and other employees spawned a substantial
number of additional entrants. The characteristics of the new firms suggest that
founders were able to transfer relevant knowledge they acquired at Intershop.
Intershop even actively supported new entry by spin-offs. It thus helped to
create conditions that were conducive to the emergence of an industry cluster.
The spin-offs stabilized and further enhanced these conditions by establishing
a network of local cooperation on the basis of their founders’ shared Inter-
shop background. Spin-off interaction gave rise to Marshallian agglomeration
economies in the network. Moreover, with the TowerByte cooperative, an
institutional setup was created that allows non-spin-off startups to partake in
the benefits accruing from the network.
Through these developments, Intershop became the nucleus of a software
industry cluster focusing on e-commerce activities, which is becoming increas-
ingly independent of the parent firm’s development. It is obviously impossible
to predict whether the cluster will eventually grow beyond the employment
level that Intershop had reached at height of its success. At present, however,
both quantitative trends and qualitative dynamics suggest a further favorable
cluster development.
The Intershop case shows how a temporarily successful dot-com firm ex-
erted a lasting beneficial effect on regional development—which might even
outlive the original firm. A general conclusion can thus be drawn that resonates
with the recent work on serial entrepreneurship. In assessing the merits of
entrepreneurial activities, not only the fate of the individual firm has to be
taken into account, but also learning effects that condition the performance of
future ventures started by the initial entrepreneur as well as other members
of the firm. A straightforward policy corollary is that, in regions faced with
the decline of individual firms, stabilizing policy interventions may target
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entrepreneurial activities out of the declining firms rather than trying to sup-
port these firms themselves.9 In this context, industry (life cycle) characteristics
affecting the viability of spin-off activities warrant close scrutiny.
The case study moreover highlights the need for policy makers to re-
main open to unforeseeable, spontaneous regional developments. Prior to
Intershop, Jena was not likely to become a center of the software industry.
The emergence of the fledgling industry was not (and probably could not
have been) based on any deliberate policy initiative. In contrast, the spin-off
activities out of Intershop were supported by private initiatives such as the
TowerByte and TowerVenture cooperatives. These might serve as models for
similar organizations elsewhere, allowing regional policy makers to restrict
themselves to providing favorable conditions and possibly inducements for
such private initiatives instead of establishing public entities.
Even though there are many differences in the details, the general finding
that Intershop enabled further entrepreneurship and industry growth in its
home region is in line with experiences made elsewhere. Our account of the
spin-off dynamics in Jena resonates with Helft’s (2006) account of how, after
PayPal was acquired by eBay, numerous new firms, including YouTube and
LinkedIn, were started by PayPal’s founders and employees. Outside of Silicon
Valley, spin-off activities emerging from Microsoft and Amazon in and around
Seattle have been noted (Markoff 2008). The developments triggered by
Pittsburgh-based FreeMarkets Inc. are even more similar to the Intershop case
because they took place in a region that is not known as a center of the software
industry. FreeMarkets, which organized B2B online auctions, experienced
a similarly spectacular decline in value as did Intershop and was acquired
in 2004. FreeMarket’s founder and its former COO started an investment
company that provided funding to several regional software businesses. Two of
them (Tiversa, SEEC) are led by former FreeMarkets executives. In addition,
spin-off activities by individual FreeMarkets employees can also be observed.
Our overall conclusion from this study is that a qualification to the ex post
assessment of the dot-com boom seems justified. Not all of the money spent
by the dot-coms has been wasted, but capabilities have been created that may
allow for more sustainable growth and performance of the surviving firms and
the second-generation entrants. The spin-off process is crucial as a transfer
mechanism for these capabilities. Given the tendency of spin-offs to locate
close to their geographical roots, it allows for regional clusters to evolve out
of temporary developments such as the dot-com bubble.
9This is in line with the more general suggestion in Buenstorf (2007b) that necessity spin-offs may
be socially beneficial because of their ability to limit the devaluation of industry-specific human
capital.
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